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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Clay Detwiler appeals from his jury convictions for aggravated 
assault and aggravated battery. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Detwiler was removed from a bar for being disruptive, calling fellow bar 
patrons racial slurs, and for having a knife in the bar. (~T Tr., p.191, L.3 - p.196, 
L.17; p.297, L.21 - p.301, L.4.) Once outside, Detwiler drove his SUV toward the 
bartender who removed him, Ashley Haynes, and Kalani Storch, a customer of 
the bar. (JT Tr., p.204, L.19 - p.14; p.307, L.5 - p.308, L.5.) Ms. Haynes 
"scattered" and got out of Detwiler's way. (JT Tr., p.206, Ls.9-11.) Storch, not as 
fortunate, was hit by Detwiler's SUV before hitting the ground. (JT Tr., p.308, L.1 
- p.309, L.4.) 
The state charged Detwiler with aggravated assault, aggravated battery, 
and malicious injury to property. (R., pp.50-51.) A jury convicted Detwiler of 
aggravated assault and aggravated battery. (JT Tr., p.534, L.2 - p.535, L.11; R., 
pp.218-200.) The court sentence Detwiler to three-years fixed followed by two-
years indeterminate for aggravated assault and a concurrent three-years fixed 
with 12 years indeterminate for aggravated battery. (Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.21-25; 
R., pp.262-265.) 
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The court re-entered Detwiler's judgment of conviction following a post-
conviction relief action, and Detwiler timely appealed from that judgment. (R., 
pp.281-288.) 
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ISSUES 
Detwiler states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether there was a fatal variance between the charging 
document and the jury instructions as they related to the 
charge of aggravated assault. 
2. Whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury as 
to the necessity defense. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow Mr. Detwiler to challenge the information in the PSI, 
and by refusing to redline information improperly included 
therein. 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Detwiler failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of 
his unpreserved claim of instructional error? 
2. Has Detwiler failed to show error in the district court's refusal to instruct 
the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity where Detwiler failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to support the giving of that instruction? 
3. Has Detwiler failed to establish the district court abused its discretion 
offering Detwiler a postponed sentencing hearing in order to address his 
concerns in the PSI? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Detwiler Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court's 
Instructions To The Jury 
A Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Detwiler argues that a fatal variance existed 
between the state's charging document and the district court's instructions to the 
jury. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) Detwiler's unpreserved variance claim is not 
properly before this Court for review. Detwiler has failed to demonstrate from the 
record that the instructions actually create a variance, much less that his claimed 
error rises to the level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citation omitted). Whether there is a variance 
between a charging document and the jury instructions at trial, and whether such 
variance is fatal to the conviction, are also questions of law given free review on 
appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 
1998). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citation 
omitted). 
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C. There Was No Variance Between The Char in Document And The 
District Court's Instructions To The Ju y 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate iaw that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 
Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 ("An error generally is not reviewable 
if raised for the first time on appeal.") ( citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 
277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in 
jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party 
objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d 
at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. kl; see also State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Detwiler did not object to the jury instructions below. Thus, to prevail on 
appeal, Detwiler must show that the complained of instruction rises to the level of 
fundamental error. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires 
Detwiler to demonstrate that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of 
[his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Correctly applying this 
5 
three-prong test to Detwiler's claim, he has failed to show fundamental error 
entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
For the first time on appeal, Detwiler asserts that the district court erred by 
giving jury instructions that varied from the state's charging document. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) Detwiler has failed, however, to show any variance. 
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different 
from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 
(1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial allow the 
jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more alternative 
theories than alleged in the charging document. See, ~. State v. Windsor, 110 
Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166, 90 P.3d 
910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). 
If it is established that a variance exists, the appellate court must examine 
whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. 
See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329, 33 P.3d 218, 220 (Ct. App. 2001 ). A 
variance is fatal if it amounts to a "constructive amendment" or "deprives the 
defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double 
jeopardy." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,479, 272 P.3d 417, 
451 (2012) (variance requires reversal "only where it deprives the defendant of 
his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy") (citation 
omitted). A constructive amendment occurs if a variance alters the charging 
document to the extent the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a 
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different nature. Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. Colwell, 124 
idaho 560, 566, 871 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993). 
There was no variance in this case because the factual basis for the 
charge was the same from beginning to end. The state charged Detwiler with 
aggravated assault, alleging: 
That the Defendant, MICHAEL CLAY DETVVILER, on or 
about the 9th day of December, 2010, in the County of Ada, State 
of Idaho, did intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability 
threaten by act to do violence upon the person of Ashley Haynes, 
with a deadly weapon, to wit: by intentionally accelerating his Ford 
Explorer SUV toward Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her 
person as she stood in front of the car, which created a well-
founded fear in Ashley Haynes that such violence was imminent. 
(R., p.51.) The prosecutor began in his opening statement at trial by telling the 
jury that the evidence would show that on December 9, 2010, Detwiler assaulted 
Ms. Haynes by intentionally driving his vehicle toward her. (JT Tr., p.140, L.15 -
p.141, L.15.) The state then spent the trial proving that case: Ms. Haynes 
testified that Detwiler intentionally accelerated and drove, "launch[ing] forward" 
toward her. (JT Tr., p.204, L.19 - p.206, L.11.) Detwiler's actions scared Ms. 
Haynes and she "scattered" to avoid being hit by his car. (JT Tr., p.206, Ls.10-
11.) Another of Detwiler's victims, Kalani Storch, confirmed Ms. Haynes' version 
of events, testifying Detweiler "looked right over at [Ms. Haynes and himself], 
popped it in drive, and pulled right back out." (JT Tr., p.308, Ls.3-5.) At the 
close of trial, the district court instructed the jury: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about December 9, 2010 
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2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant Michael Clay Detwiler committed an 
assault upon Ashley Haynes 
4. by intentionally accelerating his Ford Explorer toward 
Ashley Haynes and speeding towards her person as she 
stood in front of the Ford Explorer; and 
5. the defendant Michael Clay Detwiler committed that 
assault with a deadly weapon or instrument. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of 
the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
(Jury Instruction No.21; R., p.241.) To convict Detwiler of aggravated assault, 
the jury had to find that Detwiler intentionally accelerated and drove toward Ms. 
Haynes, which was the same theory of the case presented by the state at trial, 
and the same factual basis for the charge of aggravated assault. Therefore there 
was no variance in this case. 
On appeal, Detwiler asserts that the district court created a variance by 
giving the jury the stock instruction on the definition of assault, which explains 
that an assault occurs when a defendant either attempts to harm a victim or 
threatens to harm a victim. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11; see also R., p.240 
(instruction defining assault).) Detwiler argues that the information charged only 
the threat of violence so introducing an attempt to harm theory was error. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) This is not a clear variance, but even if it were, it 
would not be fatal because the crime articulated in the jury instructions-
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assault-was not of a greater degree or different nature than the crime charged, 
and the underlying factual nature of that crime-accelerating and driving toward 
Ms. Haynes-was unaitered. 
Detwiler's alleged variance creates no risk of double jeopardy. Whether 
he attempted or threatened harm, it would still be assault when Detwiler 
intentionally accelerated his vehicle in Ms. Haynes' direction. Even if the theories 
were mutually exclusive, which they are not, had Detwiler been acquitted on 
either theory the state would not have been able to bring a second prosecution 
on the other. In order to acquit Detwiler, the jury would necessarily have to find 
that he did not intentionally accelerate and drive toward Ms. Haynes, which was 
the central element of the crime. 
Additionally, the alleged variance does not create any clear notice issues 
for Detwiler's defense. Detwiler was given notice that he was facing trial for 
committing assault by intentionally accelerating and driving his Ford Explorer 
toward Ms. Haynes, and that is the act for which he stood trial. Detwiler argues 
a jury question during deliberation illustrates his contention that there was a fatal 
variance in the aggravated assault instruction given to the jury and the charge. 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) This argument is not persuasive. The jury sent a 
question to the trial court regarding the aggravated assault charge: 
As to Instruction No. 20, does the intent associated with assault 
have to be to injure Ashley? If we believe that Ashley was a 
bystander and not the intended target of the vehicle, has the intent 
portion of the statute been met? 
(Exhibits, un-numbered p.28.) The court's response was to "read all instructions 
that ha[d] been given" to the jury as they "determine[d] the facts and appl[ied] the 
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!aw as set forth in the instructions." (Exhibits, un-numbered p.27.) The jury was 
instructed to read the instructions as a whole and apply them to the facts as 
presented at trial. Detwiier's claim is ''the jurors asked if they could convict Mr. 
Detwiler of aggravated assault if they believed that Mr. Detwiler was not 
intending to threaten or trying to hit Ms. Haines." (Appellant's brief, p.11.) The 
question posed by the jury dealt with Detwiler's intent as he accelerated forward 
and was not inconsistent with the language of the charging document (R., p.51), 
the elements instruction (R., p.241 ), or the state's case as presented to the jury 
(JT Tr., p.204, L.19 - p.206, L.11; p.206, Ls.10-11; p.308, Ls.3-5). Contrary to 
Detwiler's claim on appeal, there was no variance depriving him of sufficient 
notice. 
Detwiler was not tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature 
from the one with which he was charged-assault by intentionally accelerating 
and driving his vehicle toward Ms. Haynes. Because the district court's 
instructions did not put Detwiler at risk of double jeopardy and did not create any 
notice issues for his defense, even if using the stock instruction to define assault 
for the jury constituted a variance, it could not be fatal. 
The state charged Detwiler with committing the crime of assault by 
intentionally accelerating and driving his Ford Explorer toward Ms. Haynes. The 
jury convicted Detwiler of that same crime-assault-on the same factual 
basis-by intentionally accelerating and driving his Ford Explorer towards 
Haynes. Because the jury convicted Detwiler of the same crime on the same 
factual basis as that charged by the state, there was no variance in the district 
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court's instructions. Detwiler has failed to show error, much less fundamental 
error. entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
11. 
Detwiler Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Refusal To Give An 
Instruction To The Jury Which Was Not Supported By The Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Detwiler contends that the district court erred by not instructing the jury as 
to the necessity defense. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-18.) Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts of this case shows no error in the court's refusal to 
give the requested instruction because Detwiler was not entitled to the 
instruction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. Detwiler Was Not Entitled To His Proposed Necessity Instruction 
A trial court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not 
supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 
1335 (1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). A defendant is 
not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of the law, is not 
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supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the evidence, or is 
adequately covered by other instructions. Johns, 112 Idaho at 881, 736 P.2d at 
1335; State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 632-33, 38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 
2002); State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). To be 
entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant must "present 
facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] defense." Camp, 
134 Idaho at 665-66, 8 P.3d at 660-61. Whether a reasonable view of the 
evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court's discretion. 
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Howley, 
128 Idaho 87 4, 878, 920 P .2d 391, 395 (1996). 
On appeal, Detwiler argues that the district court erred by refusing to give 
his requested necessity instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-18.) Detwiler's 
claim fails because he did not meet his burden of establishing that a necessity 
instruction was supported by the evidence. 
To be entitled to an instruction on the necessity defense, Detwiler had to 
show: (1) a specific threat of immediate harm; (2) the circumstances that 
necessitated the illegal act were not caused by the defendant; (3) the same 
objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative 
available to the defendant; and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to 
the harm avoided. State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 
(1990); see also I.C.J.I. 1512. Reviewing the record, the district court properly 
rejected the requested necessity instruction because "the evidence [did] not 
support the necessity defense instruction." (JT Tr., p.433, Ls.22-23.) 
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On appeai, Detwiler argues that the district court "needed to give that 
instruction" because "there was a reasonabie view of the evidence supporting the 
necessity defense." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Detwiler failed to satisfy all of the 
essential elements of a necessity defense before the district court. Those 
essential elements include the requirement that there be a specific threat of 
immediate harm. Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. Although 
Detwiler claims on appeal "that a group of men had approached his car and were 
trying to get him out of the car (implication being that they wanted to fight him)" 
(Appellant's brief, p.13), Ms. Haynes testified that although there were men 
around Detwiler's car while Detwiler was screaming racial slurs at them, the men 
were telling Detwiler to leave the area (JT Tr., p.201, Ls.1-5). 
Contrary to Detwiler's claims that he "did not bring about the actions 
leading to the necessity" (Appellant's brief, p.13), the testimony clearly showed 
Detwiler started problems inside the bar by being confrontational, using racial 
slurs, and pulling out a knife and pounding it onto the table in front of him (JT Tr., 
p.195, L.11 - p.196, L.5; p.300, L.9 - p.304, L.3), causing Ms. Haynes to kick 
him out of the bar (JT Tr., p.196, L.5 - p.197, L.20) where Detwiler proceeded to 
scream and yell racial slurs at bar patrons outside of the building (JT Tr., p.200, 
L.18 - p.201, L.5). 
Another of the essential elements of a necessity defense is a showing that 
the same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive 
alternative available to the defendant. Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 
564; I.C.J.I. 1512. Detwiler claims on appeal the only way he could remove 
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himself from the situation was to drive away, and backing up was not an option 
that would allow him to "escape the threatened harm" from a "group of 
assailants." (Appeilant's brief, p.14.) The testimony at triai showed Detwiler had 
a means of exiting the situation without having to drive his vehicle into people. 
There was no one behind Detwiler's vehicle to prevent him from leaving by 
backing up and turning onto the street (JT Tr., p.204, Ls.4-14; 205, L.23 - p.2-6, 
L.3.) Additionally, Ms. Haynes had helped clear the people away who Detwiler 
had been screaming at and offered to get him a cab. (JT Tr., p.201, L.17 -
p.202, L.3; p.323, L.14 - p.324, L.1.) Instead, Detwiler continued to scream, 
slammed the car door on Ms. Haynes and then proceeded to back up his car and 
then accelerate towards Ms. Haynes and Storch. (JT Tr., p.202, L.4 - p.205, 
L.14; p.305, L.11 - p.308, L.5.) 
Because Detwiler failed to make a prima facie case on each element of 
his proposed affirmative defense, the trial court did not err by declining to give 
Detwiler's proposed instruction which was not supported by the evidence. 
Detwiler has failed to show an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
111. 
Detwiler Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Failing To Strike 
Portions Of The Presentence Report Without Having A Separate Hearing To 
Address All Of Detwiler's Concerns 
A. Introduction 
Detwiler argues on appeal that the district court "abused its discretion by 
not red-lining or otherwise removing the improperly included information from the 
PSI at the sentencing hearing." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) Because the court did 
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in fact provide Detwiler with an opportunity to address his concerns with 
perceived mistakes in the PSI, and he declined the opportunity, Detwiler's 
argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The district court has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to 
be admitted at a sentencing hearing. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 275, 1 
P.3d 299, 303 (Ct App. 2000); State v. Viehweg, 127 Idaho 87, 92, 896 P.2d 
995, 1000 (Ct. App. 1995). It is presumed that a sentencing court was able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which was presented to it during the sentencing process, to disregard 
the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining 
evidence which may be in conflict. State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 
392 (1979); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983). 
"A district court's denial of a motion to strike or delete portions of a PSI is 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion." State v. Mole, 148 Idaho 950, 
961, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(1 ); 
State v. Rodrigues, 132 Idaho 261, 263, 971 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 1998).). 
r-
'V, Detwiler Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Trial Court's Refusal To 
Strike Portions Of The Presentence Report Without A Hearing 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32 provides: 
The presentence report may include information of a hearsay 
nature where the presentence investigator believes that the 
information is reliable, and the court may consider such information. 
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!n the trial judge's discretion, the judge may consider material 
contained in the presentence report which would have been 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence applicable at trial. 
However, while not all information is a presentence report need be 
in the form of sworn testimony and be admissible in trial, conjecture 
and speculation should not be included in the presentence report. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(1 ). The application of !.C.R. 32 has been examined 
extensively by Idaho courts: 
Under these rules, a sentencing court is free to consider the 
results of a presentence investigation if the reliability of the 
information contained in the report is insured by the defendant's 
opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine all the 
materials contained in the report, and to explain or rebut adverse 
evidence. The court may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of 
previously dismissed charges against the defendant, or evidence of 
charges which have not yet been proved, so long as the defendant 
has the opportunity to object to, or to rebut, the evidence of his 
alleged misconduct. It is error, however, for the court to consider 
such information if there is no reasonable basis to deem it reliable, 
as where the information is simply conjecture or speculation. On 
appeal, we presume that a sentencing court is able to ascertain the 
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process, to 
disregard the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to properly 
weigh the remaining evidence which may be in conflict. 
State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926, 854 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(internal citations omitted). 
On appeal, Detwiler argues the court abused its discretion by failing to 
strike or red-line information from the PSI. In fact, the court gave Detwiler the 
opportunity to go through the contested information at a separate hearing and he 
declined, instead indicating he would argue the weight of the information before 
the court. Detwiler indicated at the beginning of his sentencing argument to the 
court that he had "some issues with how the PSI was put together." (Sent. Tr., 
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p.24, Ls. "13-14.) After Detwiler addressed some specific concerns in the PSI, the 
foliowing discussion took place between the court and counsel for Detwiler: 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. If you're going to ask that 
things be removed from the PSI, then we're going to have to 
continue the hearing in so that you can go through the entire PSI 
and tell me what it is specifically that you want removed, so the 
prosecutor can then have an opportunity to say, well, yes or no. 
Those are inappropriate to be in the PSI. 
And so if you're making that argument, then we need to 
reset the sentencing, and you go through the PSI in detail because 
I'm not going to red-line or remove anything at this point. The PSI 
says what it says. And I'm certainly interested in your arguments 
as to why certain information in the PSI, that the court should not 
consider it. 
MR. BEAVER: Okay. 
Well, Your Honor, given that there are approximately four or 
five other PSls referenced in this, I guess, then, we'd have to ask 
for that. I can reference exact pages and quotes and comments in 
my arguments. I have them all written down, but we're asking for 
that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then that will require a hearing, 
just in and of itself, to determine what is admissible and what is not 
admissible. The PSI contains general information. The information 
you're talking about, you know, it doesn't carry particular weight 
with me. I mean, what I'm interested in is his prior criminal history 
before he has a head injury. He has a head injury. His history 
since then, and his propensity for violence, committing violent 
crimes, so I mean, there's a lot in there. I mean, you're asking me 
to go through and red-line stuff. Okay. That's going to take, 
probably and [sic] hour or so of a hearing, in which you're going to 
have to argue each one of those, and Mr. Stellman has the 
opportunity to respond. 
So if you want to go that route, then that's fine. We can go 
that route. Is that what you're asking to do, or do you want to go 
forward today? Otherwise I'm not removing anything at this point 
from the PSI. I'm listening to your arguments as to why you think 
the court should not be putting weight on those. 
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MR. BEAVER: Okay. Your Honor, I would argue that 
they should not be given weight then. 
-·s t ~ ,,- L 3 28 L ,....0 ' ,, en .. 1 r. 1 p.Lf, . - p. , .L .J 
Aithough given the opportunity to continue the sentencing to work through 
the specific items Detwiler felt should be red-lined from his PSI, Detwiler opted to 
go forward and instead argue what weight certain information in the PSI should 
be given. (Sent Tr., p.28, L.22 - 37, L.25.) Detwiler has failed to show an abuse 
of the court's discretion in offering an additional hearing on the contents of the 
PSI. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold Detwiler's judgments 
of conviction and sentences. 
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